The FGC Leaked Exactly What Scammers Wanted to Know
Unauthorized access to the FGC's guarantee payment system reached the names, CPFs, email addresses and dates of birth of people who received money from the fund, along with the tax withheld and the channel through which they invested. That is the script for a fake contact in the FGC's name. Here is what to expect, what the fund does, and what it never does.

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The Fundo Garantidor de Créditos, or FGC, is the private entity maintained by the banks themselves that returns up to R$250,000 per CPF when a member financial institution is wound up. On 5 November 2026, it published a statement: there had been "unauthorized access to personal information in environments related to internal processes of the guarantee payment flow." The suspicious activity was identified on 26 October.
According to the fund, there is so far no evidence that the data was published or misused, nor of any financial loss. The investigation, run with specialist firms, is still trying to establish how far the access went and whether anything was copied. Brazil's data protection authority, the ANPD, was notified, and affected individuals were alerted by email.
The FGC did not say how many people were affected.
What leaked, and why it matters
The list in the statement has two parts. The first is routine in breaches: name, CPF, email address and date of birth. The second is not:
- information on the taxes withheld from the guarantee payment;
- the distribution channel through which the guaranteed investment was made at the institution that was wound up — in other words, where the person bought the product.
Taken together, these reveal who received money from the FGC, how much tax was deducted, and which brokerage or platform the person invested through. Almost nobody knows those three things about you, which is precisely why anyone who cites them gains credibility.
The FGC said as much in its own statement: the information "may be used to make fraudulent contacts more convincing." The access is confirmed. Whether the data was copied is still under investigation.
The likely scripts
As of 12 November, we found no public report of a scam using this data. What does exist is the track record: since the liquidation of Banco Master in November 2025, the FGC's name has already been used in fraud, including a fake app offered to people awaiting reimbursement.
With the leaked data in hand, fraudulent approaches tend to follow a handful of formats. These are hypotheses, not recorded cases:
- "Refund of withheld tax." The message quotes the exact amount of income tax deducted from the guarantee and offers to return it. To do so, it asks for a fee, bank details or a code.
- A "shortfall" or "top-up" on the guarantee. The caller says there is an outstanding amount and that a fee must be paid to release it.
- The fake brokerage agent. The caller knows where you invested and presents themselves as working for that brokerage or for the FGC. They ask for the code sent by SMS, or for you to install a "support" app that in practice hands over access to your phone.
- "Confirm your data because of the incident." The message copies the genuine FGC notice and tells you to click a link to "check whether you were affected."
The last format is the hardest to spot, because the genuine notice does exist. According to an image published by g1, the FGC's email arrives with the subject line "Comunicado importante do FGC" and addresses the recipient by name. A fraudster can replicate that format.
So you cannot separate the genuine from the fake by appearance. What separates them is the request.
What the FGC does, and what it does not
On its guarantee payment page, the FGC states that it neither authorizes nor accredits any company to broker payouts, "much less to request payment of any fee or an advance deposit." Guarantee claims are made through the fund's official app, and questions go to atendimento.credores@fgc.org.br.
Two claims circulate widely and deserve care:
- "The FGC never sends SMS." That same page says no contact is made via WhatsApp or SMS. But the fund's FAQ explains that, during app registration, the code arrives by SMS from the number 30125. That is the only SMS to expect — one you requested yourself by signing up — and the code is never to be shared with anyone.
- "The FGC never sends email." The fund's long-standing warning says it does not send letters or emails to creditors. This time, however, it did: the incident notice went out by email, as data protection rules require. The email you received may well be genuine. What it will never do is ask for a payment, a code or an app installation.
If you received something
- Do not reply, do not click, and do not call the number given in the message.
- Check through the official FGC app, downloaded from your phone's app store, or by writing to atendimento.credores@fgc.org.br.
- If the message mentions your brokerage, contact the firm through the channel you already use, not the one supplied in the approach.
- Never pay a fee to receive a guarantee payout, and never give an SMS code to anyone.
- Keep the messages. The FGC asks that attempted fraud be reported to the police and to the fund.
- If you have already paid, notify your bank immediately. If it was by Pix, request a reversal through the Mecanismo Especial de Devolução.
If you have been approached this way, you can report it anonymously through the scam reporting hub.
What the rules require of the breached party
Brazil's Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados requires the controller to notify both the ANPD and the data subject of any incident that may cause relevant risk or harm (art. 48). The ANPD regulation on the subject, Resolução CD/ANPD nº 15/2024, sets a three-business-day deadline for both notifications. The clock starts when the controller learns that the incident affected personal data, not on the date of the attack (arts. 6 and 9).
The regulation also defines what the notification to the ANPD must contain. Among the required items are the date the controller learned of the incident and the number of affected data subjects. That figure exists in the filing made to the agency, but it is absent from the public statement.
Three dates are known. The FGC identified the suspicious activity on 26 October, a Monday. The ANPD told the news site O Bastidor that it was notified on the 29th, that it had opened its analysis, and that the fund was still within the deadline to supplement the information. The public notice is dated 5 November.
What remains unknown
- How many people were affected.
- Which liquidations they relate to. The FGC's 2026 payment flow includes creditors of the Master conglomerate and of Will Bank, among others, but the statement does not say the incident hit any specific group.
- Whether the data was copied.
The FGC has promised to update the statement page. If anything new emerges, this analysis will carry a dated note.
In one line
Anyone who received an FGC payout may be approached by someone who knows how much tax was deducted and where they invested. The difference between the genuine notice and the scam lies in the request for a fee, a code, a link or an app.
Sources
- Fundo Garantidor de Créditos — Comunicado sobre incidente de segurança, updated 5 November 2026, accessed 12/11/2026
- Fundo Garantidor de Créditos — Pagamento de garantia and Perguntas frequentes, accessed 12/11/2026
- Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados — Resolução CD/ANPD nº 15, de 24 de abril de 2024, arts. 5, 6 and 9
- Lei nº 13.709/2018, Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, art. 48
- O Bastidor — Hackers no FGC, 5 November 2026
- g1 — FGC sofre invasão que expõe nomes, CPFs e outros dados pessoais de clientes, 5 November 2026
- Tecnoblog — FGC sofre invasão e notifica investidores sobre dados vazados, 5 November 2026
About the author

Robert F.
request a secure channelRobert F. is the founder of CyberX, a digital intelligence operation applied to investigation, based in Brazil with cross-border reach.
He works in OSINT, on-chain tracing and antifraud for legal teams, corporate compliance, banking antifraud and public authorities.
In CyberX publications we write about what can be said in public — fraud and scam typologies, digital threats, on-chain tracing, regulation, and what separates an investigation from a database lookup. Never about a case we work on, clients, matters under judicial secrecy, or operational detail that would compromise an investigation in progress — ours or anyone else's. A third party's case enters through the public official act, and through what it teaches, not through what it exposed.
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CyberX works in digital intelligence applied to investigation — OSINT, on-chain tracing, and fraud prevention. This content is informational and does not constitute legal advice.
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