The Pix Leak List, Read End to End
The Central Bank publishes every incident involving Pix key data. There have been 25 since 2021. Read from start to finish, the list shows that a single case accounts for 97.8% of all exposed keys — and that it did not come from a bank, but from a court system. A Pix institution that leaks faces a fine, and one has already been issued. For the public agency querying the directory, the rules are different.

▸In this article
Every time data tied to Pix keys is exposed, the Central Bank of Brazil publishes a notice. Each one makes the news for a day and disappears. What almost nobody does is read the whole list, which the Central Bank itself maintains on its data protection page.
We read it. As of November 10, 2026, it recorded 25 incidents involving the Pix key directory, the DICT, since August 2021, totaling 47,928,706 keys. A single case — the Conselho Nacional de Justiça incident of July 2025 — accounts for 46,893,242 of them. The other 24 together add up to 1,035,464.
A key is not a person: the same person can hold several keys. Only the CNJ case reports both figures — 46.9 million keys belonging to 11 million people. For all the others, the Central Bank reports keys alone.
The eight largest
| Institution | Period | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) | July 20–21, 2025 | 46,893,242 |
| Banco do Estado de Sergipe (Banese) | August 24, 2021 | 414,526 |
| Acesso Soluções de Pagamento | December 3–5, 2021 | 160,147 |
| Abastece Aí | July 1 – September 14, 2022 | 137,285 |
| Sumup SCD | September 28, 2023 – March 16, 2024 | 87,368 |
| Qesh Instituição de Pagamento | September 10–19, 2024 | 53,383 |
| Fidúcia SCMEPP | January 1 – February 22, 2024 | 46,093 |
| 99Pay | June 26 – July 2, 2024 | 39,088 |
The names are those used in the official record. In nearly every case involving a Pix institution, the Central Bank's notice uses the same formula: the data was exposed "due to isolated failures in that institution's systems," and the information was "exclusively registration data" — name, CPF, institution, branch and account number. Passwords, balances and statements appear in none of them.
One caveat about 2024, the year with the most entries: there were 12, against 1 to 3 in every other full year. The jump coincides with the September 2023 rule that made notification mandatory even when an incident poses no significant risk — more on that below. It may be more notification rather than more leaking.
The case that is almost everything
The CNJ incident took place in Sisbajud, the system judges use to locate and freeze debtors' funds. According to the CNJ's own notice, dated July 23, 2025, the unauthorized access "occurred through the criminal capture of user credentials," on July 20 and 21, and affected data belonging to 11,003,398 people: name, Pix key, bank, branch and account. It is the only case on the list where the record states that the Pix key itself was exposed. The CNJ said it had notified the Federal Police and the Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados (ANPD), and opened a lookup channel with Gov.br sign-in.
The CNJ did not state through which route Sisbajud accesses the Pix directory data, and we were unable to find that information.
Three public agencies, the same door
Three of the 25 incidents did not originate at a Pix institution, but at a public agency. All three share the same root cause: credentials.
- CNJ, July 2025: "criminal capture of user credentials."
- Ministério Público de Goiás, March 1, 2026: 93 keys belonging to 51 CPFs. According to the MPGO's statement, the incident occurred in the agency's Pix key lookup system and stemmed from the compromise of a staff member's credential "owing to reuse of the institutional password on a service outside the corporate network."
- Polícia Civil do Maranhão, April 23–30, 2026: 828 keys. The Central Bank only made the case public on June 12, roughly six weeks after the end of that window.
Together, the three account for 97.8% of all exposed keys on the list.
How a public agency gets into the directory
The door exists and it is written down. Resolução BCB nº 338/2023 grants public entities direct access to the data linked to Pix keys, with no court order. Its legal basis is Article 17-B of the Money Laundering Act, the same provision that appears in the judge-free data request we covered here.
Under the resolution, access may be requested by bodies with criminal prosecution, oversight or investigative powers. Access is granted through a service account, and it is the agency itself, through an internal system, that enrolls and removes the individuals authorized to use it. The agency has a duty to adopt "due cybersecurity practices." If it fails, the Central Bank may suspend access at any time without prior notice, or revoke the agreement with 90 days' notice. We found no query volume cap for public agencies in the resolution.
What happens to those who leak
For Pix institutions, the consequence is set out in the Penalties Manual, in force since October 2025: a fine with a base value of R$100,000 to R$300,000 for failing to meet technical security requirements and thereby causing an incident involving key data. The amount is multiplied by a factor based on the institution's size.
And there has already been a penalty. In Decision 1593/2025, dated December 17, 2025, the Central Bank fined Sumup R$252,000 over the 2023–2024 incident. The decision reveals what the notice at the time called "isolated failures." Between September 2023 and March 2024, 34 of Sumup's own customers ran bulk key lookups through the app, and the system returned the name, branch, account and institution of the party on the other side. In the Central Bank's view, three things were missing: the API returned more information than the app needed, the internal query limit was deficient, and monitoring of users running large volumes of lookups without making a single payment failed. The Central Bank called the episode a "read attack." Without the reduction, the fine would have been R$360,000. It was lowered because Sumup complied on time with the notice to remediate the failures. The decision was still subject to appeal, and we found no subsequent ruling.
There is a discrepancy in the figures that the documents neither explain nor reconcile. The Central Bank's record lists 87,368 keys for this incident. The decision refers to information linked to 140,943 keys, a figure that elsewhere in the text appears as lookups of valid keys.
For public agencies, the rules are different. Resolution 338 provides for suspension and revocation of access, not fines. And the Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, in Article 52, § 3, lists the sanctions applicable to public bodies and entities, such as a warning, publication of the infraction, and blocking or deletion of the data. Fines are not among them. We found no ANPD proceeding regarding the CNJ incident. The authority's public enforcement lists that we consulted run only through October 2025.
Who notifies you
Since September 2023, the Pix Regulation, in Article 32, VIII, has required the institution where you hold your account to report an incident involving Pix-linked data "even where the account-providing participant is not responsible for the incident and even where the security incident cannot result in significant risk or harm to the data subjects." That goes beyond what the LGPD demands: Article 48 of the law only requires notification of an incident "that may result in significant risk or harm."
The procedure is set out in Instrução Normativa BCB nº 412/2023. The Central Bank confirms the incident, sends each institution the list of its own customers' keys, and sets the deadline. The notice must be individual, written in plain language, preferably delivered through the channel the institution already uses with you, and must state what happened, which data was affected, and what the risks are.
The shift is visible in the series of notices itself. Up to the September 2022 notice, the Central Bank cited Article 48 of the LGPD. From the next one onward, it began citing Article 32, VIII, of the Pix Regulation.
In the three public-agency cases, citizens were pointed down a different path: check on the agency's own website. The CNJ and the MPGO invoked Article 48 of the LGPD in their statements. In its notice on the Maranhão case, the Central Bank wrote that it was disclosing the incident "even though not required by current legislation."
What this data enables
The Central Bank repeatedly notes that the exposed data allows neither payments nor account access, and that it is "largely available from lawful lookup sources." Even so, name, CPF, bank, branch and account number, taken together, are precisely what lends credibility to a fake contact made in a bank's name.
If someone calls or writes quoting your branch and account number correctly, that does not prove they are your bank. Neither the Central Bank nor the institutions send notices about these incidents by phone, SMS, email or messaging app. The required notice comes through your institution's usual channel, and in public-agency cases the lookup is done on the agency's official website, such as the CNJ channel with Gov.br sign-in.
In one line
Of the 25 leaks of Pix-linked data the Central Bank has disclosed, the largest did not come out of any bank: it came out of a password.
Sources
- Banco Central do Brasil — Registro de incidentes com dados pessoais, captured on 09/18/2026 and recaptured on 11/10/2026
- Banco Central do Brasil — Pix incident notices, among them the September 2022 notice, the following one and the Sumup notice
- Banco Central do Brasil — Decisão 1593/2025-BCB/Derad, December 17, 2025
- Banco Central do Brasil — Notice of June 12, 2026 on the Polícia Civil do Maranhão
- Conselho Nacional de Justiça — Comunicado de Incidente de Segurança, July 23, 2025
- Ministério Público do Estado de Goiás — Statement of March 17, 2026
- Banco Central do Brasil — Resolução BCB nº 338/2023
- Banco Central do Brasil — Pix Regulation, annex to Resolução BCB nº 1/2020, Article 32, VIII, added by Resolução BCB nº 342/2023
- Banco Central do Brasil — Instrução Normativa BCB nº 412/2023
- Banco Central do Brasil — Resolução BCB nº 507/2025, Pix Penalties Manual
- Lei nº 13.709/2018, Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, Articles 48 and 52
About the author

Robert F.
request a secure channelRobert F. is the founder of CyberX, a digital intelligence operation applied to investigation, based in Brazil with cross-border reach.
He works in OSINT, on-chain tracing and antifraud for legal teams, corporate compliance, banking antifraud and public authorities.
In CyberX publications we write about what can be said in public — fraud and scam typologies, digital threats, on-chain tracing, regulation, and what separates an investigation from a database lookup. Never about a case we work on, clients, matters under judicial secrecy, or operational detail that would compromise an investigation in progress — ours or anyone else's. A third party's case enters through the public official act, and through what it teaches, not through what it exposed.
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CyberX works in digital intelligence applied to investigation — OSINT, on-chain tracing, and fraud prevention. This content is informational and does not constitute legal advice.
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